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I.   INTRODUCTION
Imagine an employee who rises at five o’clock every morning to
make the thirty minute drive to a factory job. She shows up to work,
rain or shine, and does all the work requested of her. She collects a
paycheck on a regular basis. In recognition of her years of hard work,
the employee is promoted. Her pay is increased, and she looks for-
ward to continued success. Then, one day she shows up at the factory
only to find that she is denied admittance for alleged misconduct.
Her only recourse is to plead her case before the very people in man-
agement who have accused her of wrong-doing. Should the charges
against her stand, the employee will not only be prevented from
working in this particular factory, but she will not be allowed to use
the skills that she has trained to perfect her whole life. As a condi-
                                                                                                                   
* The author thanks her family for their patience and encouragement.
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tion of employment, she agreed to waive her access to judicial review
of any such charges.
Now imagine a similar scenario in a slightly different context. An
Olympic caliber swimmer rises at five o’clock every morning, includ-
ing weekends, to make the thirty minute drive to the pool for the
first workout of the day. She shows up to practice, rain or shine, and
does the miles of swimming and hours of strength training dictated
by the coach. In recognition of her hard work and winning perform-
ances, the national governing body for swimming sends her a
monthly stipend so that she can continue to train. Then, one day she
shows up at a competition only to find that she is denied the oppor-
tunity to perform because of alleged misconduct. Her only recourse is
to plead her case before the very people who have accused her of
wrong-doing. Should the charges stand, the athlete will not be al-
lowed to compete; thus, she will no longer be eligible for a monthly
stipend or commercial endorsements that tout her status as a pre-
miere competitor. As a condition of eligibility for competition, she
waived her access to judicial review of any charges of misconduct.
Is there a substantive difference between the “traditional” em-
ployee and a “non-professional” athlete? The factory employee does a
job and collects a paycheck. National caliber athletes also do a job by
training to represent the United States in competition, and they col-
lect money for their work.1 This Comment argues that mandatory
arbitration in the traditional employment context shares similar
characteristics with mandatory arbitration in the context of athletic
competitions. In particular, this Comment examines the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee’s recently instituted policy of requiring
athletes, as a condition of eligibility to compete in the Olympics, to
waive their right to take a dispute to court.2
Part II of this Comment reviews the history of the Olympic
Movement in the United States and some of the issues that pressed
Olympic officials to come up with alternatives to lengthy and costly
court battles. Part III argues that the work of athletes is comparable
to that of “traditional” employees. Part IV discusses the nuances ex-
isting within the law and outlines factors that should be considered
when evaluating the arbitration process. Finally, this Comment ex-
amines the current Olympic arbitration system and concludes that
while arbitration may play an important role in processing time-
                                                                                                                   
1. Greco-Roman wrestler Matt Ghaffari explained, “Before, you’d get out of college
and you’d have to get a job, . . . [b]ut now, with money coming from USA Wrestling and
the USOC stipend program, you don’t have to.” Liz Robbins, Olympics Insider: Funding
Keeps Athletes Returning, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 7, 1996, at D4; see infra Part
III.
2. See Mike Spence, IOC Clause Aims to Keep Athletes out of Courtrooms, COLO.
SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, May 26, 1996, at C2.
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sensitive disputes, fairness concerns regarding the mandatory
waiver of the right to have disputes reviewed by a court must be ad-
dressed.
II.   HISTORY
A.   The United States Olympic Committee
Although the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) was
originally chartered by Congress in 1950, the Amateur Sports Act
(Act),3 passed in 1978, created the framework for the corporation
that operates today. In an effort to focus national goals for amateur
athletics, Congress gave the USOC power to “exercise exclusive ju-
risdiction, either directly or through its constituent members of
committees, over all matters pertaining to the participation of the
United States in the Olympic Games and in the Pan-American
Games.”4 Additionally, the USOC was designed to “provide for the
swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving amateur athletes,
national governing bodies, and amateur sports organizations, and
protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete . . . to participate in
amateur athletic competition .”5 To encourage this dispute resolution,
even in the international context, Congress directed the USOC to
“establish and maintain provisions for the swift and equitable reso-
lution of disputes . . . relating to the opportunity of an amateur ath-
lete . . . to participate in the Olympic Games.”6
Cognizant of the potential for dissatisfaction with the USOC de-
cision-making procedures, Congress provided that an unsatisfied
party has a right to review from any regional office of the American
Arbitration Association.7 The Act also provides that for any sporting
event held at the Olympic or Pan-American Games, the USOC can
recognize a national governing body (NGB) to develop and coordinate
that particular amateur athletic activity in the United States.8 Dis-
putes with the national governing bodies are also subject to arbitra-
tion by the American Arbitration Association.9
The legislative history of the Act reveals an intent “to promote
and coordinate” amateur athletics, “to recognize certain rights” of
athletes, and “to provide for the resolution of disputes involving na-
tional governing bodies.”10 The bill was designed to provide the
USOC with “exclusive jurisdiction  over all matters pertaining to the
                                                                                                                   
3. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396 (1994).
4. Id. § 374(3).
5. Id. § 374(8) (emphasis added).
6. Id. § 382(b).
7. See id. § 395(c).
8. See id. §§ 391-393.
9. See id. § 395(c).
10. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1627, at 1 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7478.
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participation of the United States in the Olympic games”11 and with
the power to protect the opportunity to compete. Congress elected to
strike language from the bill that would have given United States
district courts special jurisdiction for injunctive proceedings or to en-
force decisions of arbitrators.12 While Congress may have envisioned
a streamlined and equitable procedure for amateur athletes, the
USOC must operate within a larger international arena. It is within
this larger context of overlapping jurisdictions that the potential for
conflict between athletes and governing bodies reaches its peak.
B.   The Olympic Movement
Several organizations fall within the parameters of, and perform
multiple functions within, the Olympic Movement. Governed by the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Olympic Movement has
two main functions: planning association and competition among
athletes, and serving as the spark for the development of interna-
tional sports law.13 The IOC, International Federations (IF), Na-
tional Olympic Committees (NOC), the organizing committee for a
specific Olympiad, and the Olympic Congress14 make up the Olympic
Movement, and each group can exercise power within its sphere of
influence. As described infra, when an athlete is subject to rules and
regulations of more than one governing organization, the chain of
command may blur or completely disappear, thus leaving the indi-
vidual athlete at a loss as to which rules must be followed.15
1.   The International Olympic Committee
The Olympic Charter states that any person or organization in-
volved with the Olympic Movement “shall accept the supreme
authority of the IOC and shall be bound by its Rules and submit to
its jurisdiction.”16 However, the IOC, as a nongovernmental organi-
zation, does not have any power to force compliance with its wishes
and must rely on the good will of individual nations to accept and to
carry out its commands. 17
                                                                                                                   
11. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
12. See id. at 7.
13. See Anthony T. Povlino, Comment, Arbitration as Preventative Medicine for
Olympic Ailments: The International Olympic Committee’s Court of Arbitration for Sport
and the Future for the Settlement of International Sporting Disputes, 8 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 347, 350 (1994).
14. See Edward E. Hollis, III, Note, The United States Olympic Committee and the
Suspension of Athletes: Reforming Grievance Procedures Under the Amateur Sports Act of
1978, 71 IND. L.J. 183, 184 (1995).
15. See infra Part II.C.1.
16. JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 233 (1988).
17. See Hollis, supra note 14, at 184.
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2.   National Olympic Committees
The Olympic Charter also provides that the IOC shall recognize
each NOC in individual nations.18 The NOCs “shall be the sole
authorities responsible for the representation of their respective
countries at the Olympic Games as well as at other events held un-
der the patronage of the IOC.”19 In the United States, the NOC is the
United States Olympic Committee. Between the IOC and the NOCs,
however, exists another set of governing bodies, the International
Federations.
3.   The International Federations
An IF autonomously supervises a specific sport at the interna-
tional level, subject only to the limitations in the Olympic Charter.20
An IF’s responsibilities include conducting international competi-
tions, detailing eligibility rules, choosing judges and referees for
competitions, running world championships, and resolving technical
issues in their sport.21 These powerful organizations, with authority
to set their own rules, often come into conflict with national govern-
ing bodies over athlete eligibility.22
4.   The National Governing Bodies
As designed by the Act, the NGBs are administrative bodies rec-
ognized by the USOC as having responsibility for running individual
sports in the United States.23 According to the Act, the NGBs are to
conduct the selection process that determines who will be recom-
mended to the USOC for inclusion on the team sent to the Olympic
or Pan-American Games, and are to create internal standards for
eligibility to compete in all types of domestic and international ama-
teur competition.24 Therefore, before an athlete can appeal to the
USOC, she must first comply with any NGB procedures for challeng-
ing an eligibility rule. The athlete then may face additional or differ-
ent rules and/or sanctions imposed by an IF. In the United States,
the possibility of judicial intervention adds another potential level of
regulation in the process.
                                                                                                                   
18. See NAFZIGER, supra note 16, at 235-36.
19. Id. at 236.
20. See Hollis, supra note 14, at 185.
21. See Stephen A. Kaufman, Note, Issues in International Sports Arbitration, 13
B.U. INT’L L.J. 527, 531 (1995).
22. See infra Part II.C.1.
23. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 391-393 (1994).
24. See id. § 393(5)-(6).
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C.   Need for Resolution
With so many overlapping jurisdictions, resolution of eligibility
disputes can prove to be complex, lengthy, and expensive. At the in-
ternational level, differences in the selection process among NOCs,
coupled with the difficulties facing a national court that is trying to
obtain jurisdiction over an international body allegedly violating an
athlete’s national citizen rights, can quickly turn athletic eligibility
into a confusing morass. The nature of athletic competition, however,
requires quick decisions. If one athlete cannot compete, another is
always ready to fill the position. Once the race is run, the opportu-
nity is gone. Especially when a spot on the Olympic team hangs in
the balance or when the chance to win an Olympic gold medal may
be denied, lengthy court battles are not a valid option. As discussed
below, the Butch Reynolds court battle played out as a worst-case
scenario that put the sports world on notice that it had to find a bet-
ter solution.
1.   The Controversy That Would Not Go Away: Butch Reynolds
and the International Amateur Athletic Federation Square Off
After competing in a track and field event in Monte Carlo in
August 1990, Butch Reynolds submitted to a random drug test.25 The
individual world record holder in the 400 meters and gold and silver
medalist in the 1988 Olympics tested positive for trace amounts of
the steroid Nandrolone, a drug prohibited by the International Ama-
teur Athletic Federation (IAAF).26 Banned by the IAAF from all in-
ternational track competitions for two years, Reynolds was effec-
tively shut out of any opportunity to compete in the 1992 Olympics.27
The United States NGB for track and field, then called The Athletics
Congress (TAC), offered a hearing to Reynolds, but no date had been
set when Reynolds filed suit in Ohio, alleging that the test was given
negligently and provided incorrect results.28 Having failed to exhaust
all administrative remedies, and finding no state action that would
implicate due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, the dis-
trict court dismissed the due process claim and stayed any further
proceedings until the administrative remedies were exhausted.29 On
appeal, the entire case was dismissed because Reynold’s failure to
                                                                                                                   
25. See Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1112 (6th
Cir. 1994).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Reynolds v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., Inc., No. C-2-91-0003, 1991 WL
179760, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 1991).
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exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit left the district
court without subject matter jurisdiction.30
In an effort to exhaust his administrative remedies, Reynolds,
following the procedures outlined in the Amateur Sports Act and the
USOC Constitution, submitted his dispute to an American Arbitra-
tion Association panel.31 The arbitrator’s decision completely cleared
Reynolds.32 The IAAF, however, did not honor the arbitrator’s find-
ings because the arbitration did not conform to IAAF rules; thus, the
ban was not lifted.33 In compliance with IAAF procedure, Reynolds
appealed to TAC, and that body also cleared Reynolds, finding that
“substantial doubt” had been cast on the validity of the drug test.34
Refusing to change its decision, the IAAF initiated another inde-
pendent arbitration on the theory that TAC had “misdirected it-
self.”35 Conducted in London, the home base of operations for the
IAAF, this arbitration panel concluded that the tests were valid, and
as there was “no doubt” about Reynolds’ guilt, the two-year ban
stayed in place.36
Reynolds then filed another action in the Southern District of
Ohio that claimed breach of contract, breach of contractual due proc-
ess, defamation, and tortious interference with business relations.37
Reynolds wanted monetary damages and a temporary restraining
order that would permit him to run races prior to the United States
Olympic trials.38 The IAAF denied that the district court had juris-
diction and refused to appear.39 Reynolds qualified for the trials.40
Three days before the trials, the district court conducted a hearing
on Reynolds’ eligibility to compete, but the IAAF again refused to
appear.41 Despite a favorable lower court ruling, Reynolds had to
submit an emergency motion to Supreme Court Justice John Paul
Stevens to preserve his opportunity to compete in the trials.42
                                                                                                                   
30. See Reynolds v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., Inc., 935 F.2d 270, 270 (6th Cir.
1991).
31. See Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1112.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 1112-13.
35. Id. at 1113.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. In his order, Justice Stevens wrote, “[A] decent respect for the incompa-
rable importance of winning a gold medal in the Olympic Games convinces me that a pe-
cuniary award is not an adequate substitute for the intangible values for which the
world’s greatest athletes compete.” Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 505
U.S. 1301, 1301 (1992).
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The IAAF threatened to bar from the Olympics every athlete who
competed with Reynolds in the trials, but eventually the USOC and
the IAAF reached an agreement that allowed Reynolds to compete
and to qualify as a relay alternate.43 However, the IAAF would not
allow Reynolds to actually compete in the Olympics and added four
months to the two-year ban as a penalty for competing in the United
States trials.44
In the action for monetary damages, the IAAF again refused to
appear, and Reynolds was awarded $27,356,008, with more than
$20,000,000 of the award as punitive damages.45 When Reynolds be-
gan garnishment proceedings in 1993 against corporations with ties
to the IAAF, the Association finally appeared before the district
court to argue lack of jurisdiction.46 Four years after the original eli-
gibility dispute arose, this final suit for damages was dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction.47 The Olympics had come and gone. The
endorsement opportunities had disappeared.48 Efforts to comply with
conflicting regulations from an NGB and an IF proved fruitless for
an athlete trying to compete.
2.   Arbitration as a Possible Solution
The courts are not the ideal forum to settle athletic disputes.
Speed is of the essence. As the long and tortuous history of the Butch
Reynolds saga shows, international parties can throw a wrench into
American judicial processes, and the lack of clear and definite proce-
dures to handle disputes can confuse those who try to comply with
the rules.
Mandatory arbitration may offer a partial solution. Within the
United States, arbitration in sports has been a workable solution.
The American Arbitration Association has provided several arbitra-
tions within forty-eight hours of the complaint being filed.49 General
Counsel and Director of Legal Affairs for the USOC, Ronald T.
Rowan, reported that since 1983, 109 athletes have filed claims that
they had been denied the chance to make the Olympic or Pan-
American Team, and of those complaints that could not be resolved,
                                                                                                                   
43. See Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1113.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1114. The court cited “the suppression of evidence, threats levied
against Reynolds and his fellow athletes, and the extension of Reynolds’ suspension for an
additional four months” as a basis for the punitive award. Id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1121.
48. Reynolds alleged that as a result of the IAAF drug report he lost endorsement
contracts worth over $2,500,000 and appearance fees worth over $1,500,000. See id. at
1117.
49. See Ronald T. Rowan, Speech: Legal Issues and the Olympics, 3 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 395, 409 (1996).
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forty-three have gone to arbitration.50 Twenty-three of those forty-
three arbitration cases have been decided in favor of the athlete.51
Athletes appear to have at least an opportunity to defend their
rights to compete.
Realizing the need to inject consistency and fairness in the reso-
lution of international sports disputes, the IOC created the Interna-
tional Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) to “facilitate the set-
tlement of sports-related disputes through arbitration and to ensure
the protection of the rights of the parties in the context of the arbi-
tration of disputes connected with sport.”52 This newly formed group
is based in Switzerland, and generally operates under Swiss law.53
The ICAS took center stage during the summer Olympic Games in
Atlanta when, for the first time, all athletes, coaches, and officials
had to agree to submit their disputes to ICAS procedures for manda-
tory and binding arbitration as a pre-condition to participation in the
Olympics.54
D.   The Olympic Entry Clause
Particularly worried that athletes competing in the Atlanta
Games would seek relief in the courts of the United States for their
disputes, the IOC added a clause to the entry form that said that any
dispute would go, in accordance with ICAS procedures, to the Court
of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) for “final and binding arbitration.”55
The form continued: “[T]he decisions of CAS shall be final, non-
appealable and enforceable. I shall not institute any claim, arbitra-
tion or litigation, or seek any other form of relief in any other court
or tribunal.”56 Any athlete refusing to sign the entry form was denied
the opportunity to compete.57
When 11,000 athletes from 197 countries showed up to compete in
Atlanta,58 the team of arbitrators sent by the ICAS were also in
town, ready to “provide athletes with a fair, fast, independent and
inexpensive way of resolving disputes.”59 Typical controversies fre-
quently involve drug testing or general eligibility requirements.60 Of-
                                                                                                                   
50. See id. at 410.
51. See id.
52. Kaufman, supra note 21, at 532 (citation omitted).
53. See Richard C. Reuben, And the Winner Is . . . Arbitrators to Resolve Disputes as
They Arise at Olympics, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1996, at 20.
54. See id.
55. ATLANTA COMM. FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES, ENTRY BY NAME 1 (1996).
56. Id.
57. See Spence, supra note 2.
58. See Mark Conrad, Arbitration Name of the Game at the Olympics, 216 N.Y.L.J. 5,
5 (1996).
59. Waiver Form a Must for Olympic Athletes, HOUS. CHRON., May 9, 1996, at Sports
15.
60. See Conrad, supra note 58, at 5.
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ten, the mere threat of litigation by athletes had been enough to pre-
vent governing organizations from trying to impose sanctions on an
athlete.61 The system put into place in Atlanta was ostensibly de-
signed to handle the concerns of both athletes and Olympic govern-
ing officials.62
Although arbitration is gaining popularity as a quicker and less
costly alternative to litigation of sports-oriented controversies, a
mandatory waiver of rights to seek redress, particularly the clause
included on the Olympic entry form discussed above, may be subject
to attack. For many Olympic caliber athletes, training and compet-
ing in their chosen sport is their job—their means of supporting
themselves and their families. As a result, any contract agreement
between the athlete/employee and governing officials/employer
should be subject to standard contract analysis.
III.   OLYMPIC ATHLETES HAVE A JOB TO DO
When the modern Olympics were launched in 1896, French Baron
Pierre de Coubertin made sure that the rules of the Games would
require all competitors to be amateurs.63 Today, the idea of amateur-
ism in the Olympics is all but obliterated.64 In 1994, “amateur” was
deleted from the Olympic Charter, which now reads “the best ath-
letes” in each sport will compete in the Games.65 Television deals are
rumored to deliver $1 billion to the IOC every four years, and multi-
million dollar endorsement deals for athletes are not startling
news.66 Gymnast Kerri Strug and sprinter Michael Johnson were
projected to make $2 million each in 1996 alone, based on their per-
formances in Atlanta.67
Not every athlete can expect to achieve celebrity status or to gar-
ner million dollar endorsement deals, but that does not mean non-
                                                                                                                   
61. See id. In one of the more well-known cases, figure skater Tonya Harding filed
suit in Oregon state court prior to a hearing scheduled by the USOC to administratively
review Harding’s eligibility to compete in the 1994 Winter Olympic Games. The skater
filed for “a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the hearing
along with $25 million in compensatory and punitive damages if she was banned from the
games.” The suit was eventually dropped, and Harding skated in the Olympics when the
USOC withdrew its opposition to her eligibility. See Hollis, supra note 14, at 195.
62. For a discussion of how this new arbitration system worked at the Atlanta
Games, see infra Part V.
63. See Rick Telander, Money Players Get a Chance at Just Rewards in Olympics,
CHI.- SUN TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at Sports 111.
64. See id.
65. Rick Lawes, Getting Paid to Play, On and Off the Field, USA TODAY, Aug. 4,
1996, at Sports (visited Jan. 26, 1998) <http://www.usatoday.com/olympics/olyfs278.htm>.
66. See id. NBC has reportedly agreed to two separate deals that will pay the IOC
$3.55 billion to broadcast five Olympic Games between 2000 and 2008. See Christine
Brennan, No Small Change for USOC , THE WASH. POST, May 12, 1996, at D1.
67. See Randall Lane & Peter Spiegel, The Year of the Michaels (The Highest-Paid
Athletes), FORBES, Dec. 16, 1996, at 244.
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celebrity athletes go without any remuneration. The USOC’s budget
for athlete support was reported at $2.2 million during the four years
prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics.68 That figure jumped to $21 million
prior to the 1992 Barcelona Olympics and approached nearly $30
million prior to the Atlanta Games.69
Support from the USOC or individual NGBs may be the only
money that some athletes receive to pay the bills. Typical of many
athletes who compete in “non-professional” sports, a field hockey
player quit a retail job because she could not work and train.70 A
Greco-Roman wrestler supported his sports career, as well as his
wife and two-year-old daughter, with private contributions that
barely totaled $30,000 and with limited support from the USOC.71
Some have characterized most Olympic athletes not as getting rich,
but as surviving.72
Five types of grants are available to United States athletes via
the USOC. First, a basic grant of $2500 annually for each athlete on
the Olympic roster of each of the forty-one summer and winter sports
is given to the NGBs to disperse as they see fit.73 Second, an athlete
who qualifies as a “basic grantee” and has a total income below a set
limit, usually $50,000, may qualify for special assistance by showing
specific need and adequate performance in their sport.74 Athletes
considering attending college may also qualify for tuition assis-
tance.75 Additionally, the Olympic Job Opportunities Program helps
athletes find employment with not-for-profit or government enti-
ties.76
The total payment to an athlete under these first four categories
may not exceed $15,000 a year.77 The $15,000 limit, however, does
not include money that the USOC or NGBs may pay on behalf of an
athlete for training facilities, coaches, or even vitamins.78
The final, and most lucrative, type of grant is Operation Gold,
which is essentially prize money.79 A gold medal in Atlanta earned a
United States athlete $15,000, a silver netted $10,000, a bronze
                                                                                                                   
68. See Mike Harris, USOC Helps Fill the Money Gap for Athletes, RICHMOND-TIMES
DISPATCH, July 14, 1996, at D1.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Robbins, supra note 1.
72. See Harris, supra note 68.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. The employing entities are compensated for hiring athletes that will need
work-time flexibility.
77. See Harris, supra note 68.
78. See Robbins, supra note 1.
79. See Harris, supra note 68.
666 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:655
earned $7500, and a fourth place finish garnered $5000.80 In non-
Olympic years, similar but slightly lower payments are awarded to
world championship competitors.81
The payments from the USOC, however, represent only part of
the bounty available to athletes. The NGBs also offer cash awards
for medals.82 For example, in Atlanta, USA Wrestling planned to
award “$25,000 for gold, $15,000 for silver, and $10,000 for bronze.”83
Placing the stakes even higher, United States Swimming offered
$50,000 for a gold medal.84 Couple the grants with prize money,
throw in commercial endorsements and appearance fees, and top off
the package by paying various coaching and training expenses, and
an Olympic athlete may well have their entire livelihood dependent
upon competing in their sport. Even without the big money en-
dorsement deals, appearance fees, and prize money, approximately
1600 athletes rely on their eligibility to compete to keep the monthly
checks coming to them from the USOC.85
Additionally, athletes may substantially change their life’s station
in reliance on the opportunities provided by their athletic eligibility.
For example, after qualifying for three Olympic events, swimmer
Tom Dolan forfeited his remaining NCAA eligibility at the Univer-
sity of Michigan to take advantage of the $1200 per month available
to him through the USOC and United States Swimming.86 Once he
started receiving grants and benefiting from endorsements con-
nected to the Olympics, he was cut off from ever returning to colle-
giate competition.87 Had he lost his eligibility prior to the Atlanta
Games, he would have been banned from both collegiate and inter-
national competition, as well as losing his monthly support, his
chance at prize money, and endorsement deals that depended on his
performance at the Olympics.
Sports competition is thus employment for many athletes. Train-
ing for and traveling to competitions takes time, time that might
otherwise be spent working a more traditional job. Monthly support
                                                                                                                   
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Robbins, supra note 1.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Brennan, supra note 66.
87. NCAA rules on amateur status state that an individual loses amateur status and
thus becomes ineligible for intercollegiate competition when the individual “[a]ccepts a
promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate
athletics participation.” NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOC., RULES AND REGU-
LATIONS, RULE 12.1.1(b) (1994). Additionally, accepting any bonus money for winning a
medal would also violate the NCAA rule prohibiting payments “conditioned on the indi-
vidual’s or team’s place finish or performance.” Id. § 12.1.2(j).
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checks may be the only source of income for some athletes.88 Athletes
who have achieved celebrity status, or hope to achieve such revered
status, may have millions of dollars worth of endorsement opportu-
nities tied to their eligibility. While mandatory and binding arbitra-
tion may offer the speed and efficiency that Olympic officials desire,
the validity of arbitration clauses, like those in the Olympic entry
form should be closely scrutinized as if they were mandatory arbi-
tration clauses in employment contracts.
IV.   EVALUATING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS REQUIRING
MANDATORY ARBITRATION
A.   The United States Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court adheres to a “liberal federal policy favor-
ing arbitration agreements.”89 The Court found that Congress explic-
itly created the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)90 to “overcome an
anachronistic judicial hostility to agreements to arbitrate.”91 The
Court also espoused the view that the FAA mandates that “any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration.”92 The pertinent language of the FAA reads:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract . . . or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.93
Commerce, for purposes of the FAA, is defined to mean “commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations . . . but nothing
herein contained shall apply to contract of employment of . . . any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”94
Despite this announced preference for arbitration, the Court may
scrutinize employment contracts that contain mandatory arbitration
clauses. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. ,95 the Court
explicitly refused to address whether the FAA excludes “all contracts
                                                                                                                   
88. See id.
89. Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)).
90. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-208, 301-307 (1994).
91. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625 n.14 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 626 (citation omitted).
93. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
94. Id. § 1.
95. 500 U.S. 20 (1990).
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of employment” from its coverage.96 The Gilmer Court did, however,
touch on the issue of unequal bargaining power between employers
and employees and stated that “[m]ere inequality in bargaining
power” would not convince the Court that employment arbitration
agreements should never be enforceable.97 Instead, the Court said
that unequal bargaining power claims would have to be resolved on
a case-by-case basis.98
Gilmer was not a unanimous decision, and Justice Stevens ar-
gued, in a vigorous dissent, that “arbitration clauses contained in
employment agreements are specifically exempt from coverage of the
FAA.”99 Justice Stevens cited comments made by the chairman of the
American Bar Association committee that drafted the bill—
comments that assured Senators that the bill “[was] not intended
[to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.”100 The Court noted
that at hearings on the bill, Senator Walsh added:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these con-
tracts that are entered into are really not [voluntary] things at all.
. . . A man says, “These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it.”
Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then
he surrenders his right to have his case tried by the court, and has
to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at
all.101
Furthermore, Justice Stevens stated that the Court too readily dis-
missed the problem of inequality of bargaining power.102 In an arbi-
tration case decided seven years prior to Gilmer, the Court warned
that “courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelm-
ing economic power that would provide grounds ‘for the revocation of
any contract.’”103 However, when Gilmer, a sixty-two-year-old em-
ployee, tried to challenge an arbitration agreement that he had
signed as a condition of employment, the Court found “no indication .
. . that Gilmer . . . was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbi-
tration clause.”104
                                                                                                                   
96. Id. at 25 n.2. The issue was raised by amici curiae and was not a part of the case-
in-chief. Additionally, the clause at issue was in a securities registration application but
was not an actual part of Gilmer’s employment contract. See id.
97. Id. at 33.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
100. Id. at 39 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
101. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
102. See id. at 43.
103. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1985)).
104. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
1998]                        OLYMPIC ARBITRATION 669
B.   Other Grounds for Revocation That Could Affect the Enforcement
of Contracts With Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
Unconscionability, adhesion, duress, and age of majority are four
other factors bearing on the enforceability of a contract.105 If a con-
tract or one of its terms “is unconscionable at the time the contract is
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may
so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any
unconscionable result.”106 Some jurisdictions have held that uncon-
scionable contracts are not enforceable as a matter of common law.
For example, in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. ,107 the
court stated that unconscionability occurs when there is “an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party.”108 The Williams court stated further that “[i]n many cases the
meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bar-
gaining power.”109
A contract of adhesion is a standardized contract that has been
drawn and imposed by the party holding superior bargaining power,
and the party accepting the terms may only “adhere to” the contract
or reject it.110 However, a contract of adhesion is not necessarily un-
enforceable. Courts have ruled that to recognize adhesion in a con-
tract is “‘the beginning and not the end of the analysis insofar as en-
forceability of its terms is concerned.’”111
Duress often involves imposing improper pressure to overcome a
party’s will or inducing assent by improper threat that leaves a party
no reasonable alternative to signing a contract.112 Although ordinary
contracts usually imply that the offeror will not make a deal unless
her terms are met, bargaining is to be expected.113 Beyond the threat
of physical harm, “[m]odern decisions have recognized as improper a
much broader range of threats, notably those to cause economic
harm . . . . The rules . . . [also] recognize as improper the modern ex-
                                                                                                                   
105. See William F. McHugh, Private Arbitration of Public Law Claims; Key Issues,
(Feb. 23, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). A fifth factor discussed by
Professor McHugh is fraud, but, for the purposes of this paper, fraud will not be ad-
dressed.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
107. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
108. Id. at 449.
109. Id.
110. McHugh, supra note 105, at 2.
111. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1981) (quoting Wheeler v.
St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)).
112. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 504 (6th ed. 1990).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (1981).
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tensions under developing notions of ‘economic duress’ or ‘business
compulsion.’”114
Finally, attaining the age of majority, and thereby having the ca-
pacity to enter a valid contract, is another consideration that is of
special concern in the Olympic context. Many of the athletes in the
Olympics are under the age of eighteen,115 but according to the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts , “[u]nless a statute provides other-
wise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable con-
tractual duties until the beginning of the day before the person’s
eighteenth birthday.”116 The Restatement reports that forty-nine
states have lowered the common law age of majority below twenty-
one, and the lowered age is usually eighteen.117 Thus, a United
States Olympic athlete under the age of eighteen would appear to
have the power to disaffirm any contract signed prior to her eight-
eenth birthday. Could the underage athlete then avoid the arbitra-
tion requirement?
Contracts signed by minors often require the additional signature
of a parent.118 However, this co-signature does not necessarily limit
the minor child’s right to void her contractual agreement.119 In Del
Bosco v. United States Ski Association ,120 the court asserted that any
age requirement for valid “contracts is designed ‘to protect minors
from their possibly improvident and imprudent contractual commit-
ments.’ As a result, a party who contracts with a minor ‘does so at
his own peril and with the attendant risk that the minor may, at his
election, disaffirm the transaction.’”121 In Del Bosco, a fourteen-year-
old skier and her parent signed an “Acknowledgment and Assump-
tion of Risk and Release” prior to the skier’s injury in a ski race.122
The court noted that “approval by a parent does not necessarily vali-
date an infant child’s contract.”123
At least five other states have directly decided that a parent’s
signature does not validate an infant’s contract.124 However, other
                                                                                                                   
114. Id. cmt. a.
115. See Brennan, supra note 66. For example, gold medal gymnast Dominique
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116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981).
117. See id. cmt. a.
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Simmons v. Parkette Nat’l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 143 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
119. See Del Bosco, 839 F. Supp. at 1474.
120. 839 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Co. 1993).
121. Id. (citations omitted).
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123. Id. (citation omitted).
124. See id. n.2.
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jurisdictions have statutorily provided that parental consent can
bind a child in certain legal matters.125
C.   Application in the Olympic Context
Olympic athletes do not have any meaningful choice in deciding
whether to sign the entry form. If an athlete does not sign the form,
the athlete does not compete. For whatever reason an athlete wants
to appear in the Olympics—fulfillment of personal training or com-
petition goals, completing requirements for monetary support, or
simply accepting what may be a once-in-a-life-time chance to partici-
pate in a time-honored tradition of excellence—the only way to make
that coveted appearance is to sign the form. The Olympic Charter
mandates that every person involved with the Olympics accept the
“supreme authority of the IOC” and agree to be bound by the IOC’s
rules.126 An individual athlete will not have the power to resist the
demands of the IOC and still retain the right to compete.
The Olympic arbitration clause on the entry form is a take-it-or-
leave-it proposition. However, the contract between the athlete and
the IOC is not per se invalid. Other factors, such as the impartiality
of arbitrators,127 may be considered in tandem with the adhesion to
determine enforceability.
Arguably, Olympic athletes have no reasonable alternative to
agreeing to mandatory and binding arbitration. As discussed earlier
in this Comment,128 athletes depend on participation in the Olympics
to support themselves or to fulfill terms of commercial endorse-
ments. The opportunity to compete in the Olympics in any one given
sport only occurs once every four years. Although there are excep-
tions, an athlete may have only one chance at the Olympic Games.
That one shot is now tied to a waiver of the right to access the courts
to settle disputes.
Finally, both the 1996 United States Olympic Team Code of Con-
duct and Grievance Procedures require the participant’s signature; a
parent or guardian must sign for participants of minority age.129 Ac-
                                                                                                                   
125. See Simmons v. Parkette Nat’l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 144
n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
126. NAFZIGER, supra note 16, at 233.
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128. See supra Part III.
129. See U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., 1996 UNITED STATES OLYMPIC TEAM CODE OF CONDUCT
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cording to the General Counsel for the USOC, “there is no contrac-
tual obligation on the part of an athlete under 18 years of age.”130 If it
is true that an under age athlete has “no contractual obligation,”131
then the child athlete could arguably initiate proceedings outside of
the Olympic agreement regardless of any parental signature. If there
was no contract created with the child, the parental validation ar-
gument would not apply.132
D.   Factors to Consider in Determining Fairness of Arbitration
Despite the suspect attributes of forcing mandatory and binding
arbitration on Olympic athletes, arbitration can be a viable option
for settling Olympic disputes. The Olympics hold a special place in
the sports world:
The Olympic Games stand as a model of fairness and equal oppor-
tunity for achievement, not only to athletes but to entire nations.
Judicial resolution of disputes, while embodying the impartiality
sought by aggrieved parties in positions of inferior bargaining
power, is not without its price and, in the context of amateur ath-
letic competition, too often that price would manifest itself in lost
opportunities.133
The IOC-developed arbitration body, CAS, should strive to protect
the rights of the athletes and to address the need for fair and effi-
cient resolution of disputes.
Fine-tuning the Olympic arbitration process could address some
of the fairness concerns that arise when an athlete is forced to par-
ticipate in the process. For instance, in 1994, the United States De-
partments of Labor and Commerce issued a report containing rec-
ommendations for binding arbitration to be used in public law dis-
putes.134 The report’s quality standards for an arbitration system
might work well in the Olympic arbitration context. These require-
ments include:
                                                                                                                   
130. Letter from Ronald T. Rowan, General Counsel, United States Olympic Commit-
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1998]                        OLYMPIC ARBITRATION 673
a neutral arbitrator who knows the laws in question and under-
stands the concerns of the parties;
a fair and simple method by which the employee can secure the
necessary information to present his or her claim;
. . . .
the right to independent representation if the employee wants it;
a range of remedies equal to those available through litigation;
a written opinion by the arbitrator explaining the rationale for the
result; and
sufficient judicial review to ensure that the result is consistent
with the governing laws.135
While advocating a “wait and see” approach to the mandatory use of
private arbitration systems, the report did propose forbidding bind-
ing arbitration agreements of public law claims as a condition of
employment.136 The report relied on the FAA to support its position,
but should there be any doubt about the scope of the FAA, the report
urged Congress to “pass legislation making it clear that any choice
between available methods for enforcing statutory employment
rights should be left to the individual who feels wronged rather than
dictated by his or her employment contract.”137
V.   THE CURRENT OLYMPIC ARBITRATION SYSTEM
A.   Developing the Process
Operating since 1983, the CAS was originally designed to accept
only cases in which all parties involved in a dispute agreed to submit
to its jurisdiction.138 Promoted as an independent organization made
up of 150 arbitrators representing thirty-seven countries,139 the CAS
is headquartered, along with the IOC, in Lausanne, Switzerland.140
All CAS arbitrators are “persons with legal training and recognized
competence with regard to sport. Their experience enables the arbi-
trators to facilitate the settlement of disputes by offering a solution
adapted to the sporting context.”141 Because Swiss private interna-
tional law governs CAS proceedings,142 the Swiss federal Supreme
Court heard a 1993 challenge to a CAS award and affirmed the
power of the CAS to validly bind parties to its decisions.143 However,
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138. See International Olympic Comm., Arbitration and the Olympic Movement
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the Swiss Supreme Court also recommended that the CAS reduce its
level of dependency on the IOC.144 As a result, in 1994, the 102nd
IOC session approved the creation of the ICAS to replace the IOC as
the supervisor and financier of the CAS.145
ICAS is composed of twenty members, consisting of a mixture of
representatives of the IFs, ANOCs, and the IOC.146 The members
must sign a declaration “undertaking to perform their functions in a
personal capacity, with total objectivity and independence, and in
conformity with the provisions of the Code of Sports-Related Arbi-
tration.”147 In an effort to further guarantee impartiality and inde-
pendence of CAS arbitrators, the ICAS members are prohibited from
serving as a CAS arbitrator or as counsel to any party appearing be-
fore the CAS.148
Although the CAS is a permanent body, a short-term arbitration
process was created to specifically address issues arising during the
Atlanta Olympic Games, and as discussed, the IOC demanded that
as a condition of competing, all disputes be resolved, through ICAS
procedures, by the CAS.149 From its list of CAS arbitrators, ICAS
created an Ad Hoc Division (AHD) of CAS150 and sent approximately
twelve arbitrators to Atlanta to settle disputes on the spot.151 A panel
of three arbitrators heard each case.152
Filing a written application with the AHD office starts the arbi-
tration process. Upon receipt of the paperwork, the President of the
AHD chooses a panel of three arbitrators from the AHD.153 Subject to
time constraints, the parties to the arbitration are allowed to have
counsel.154 The AHD panel must reach a decision within twenty-four
hours of filing,155 but in the case of extreme urgency, such as exclu-
sion from impending competition, a stay may be immediately issued
so that the competition can proceed as planned.156 If the determina-
tion is later made that an athlete should have been excluded, the
athlete would be disqualified, and the results changed accordingly.157
The AHD panels must review each case in light of the Olympic
Charter, the applicable rules of each sport and the NOC, and
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“general principles of law,” but the ICAS rules do not define “general
principles of law.”158 If any part of the dispute cannot be resolved, the
unresolved issues proceed to a regular CAS process, but the same
panel that heard the dispute at the Olympics remains assigned to
the dispute.159 “A final award by the AHD is immediately enforceable
because it is not subject to appeal.”160
B.   Arbitration at the Atlanta Games
The AHD heard six disputes during the 1996 Atlanta Olympic
Games,161 and no lawsuits were filed as a result of any AHD deci-
sions.162 Four of the arbitrations required the AHD to determine
whether an athlete would be excluded from competition or be al-
lowed to continue. Two athletes whose eligibility was contested were
allowed to compete, and two athletes accused of drug use were al-
lowed to keep their medals.163 One athlete’s disqualification, based
on a referee’s decision, was upheld.164
One AHD decision resolved a dispute between the United States
NGB for swimming and the Irish NOC.165 The United States wanted
Irish swimmer Michelle Smith disqualified from the 400-meter
freestyle when the Irish NOC tried to substitute Smith into the 400-
meter freestyle after the entry deadline.166 The IF for swimming,
FINA, initially refused to allow the substitution, but when FINA was
informed that the IOC was not strictly enforcing the entry deadline,
FINA reversed its decision and allowed Smith to enter.167 The three-
member AHD panel met for two hours and ruled in favor of the Irish
swimmer.168
In another decision, the CAS panel overruled an IOC decision to
strip medals from two Russian athletes who tested positive for the
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159. See id.
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drug bromantan.169 The IOC argued that bromantan was a perform-
ance-enhancing stimulant, but Russian Olympic officials countered
that the drug was neither a stimulant nor officially on the banned
list.170 The AHD panel discovered that athletes in the 1988 and 1992
Olympics had used bromantan, and it heard testimony from the
AHD-appointed medical expert that lack of data made it impossible
to predict the quantitative effect of bromantan.171 Acknowledging
that bromantan was not specifically designated in the IOC Medical
Code of prohibited substances, and dissatisfied with the medical evi-
dence about the stimulant qualities of bromantan, the AHD panel
decided to let the Russian athletes keep their medals.172
A French boxer who was disqualified by a referee for allegedly
punching an opponent below the belt also tried to initiate an AHD
arbitration.173 The AHD panel refused to accept the application and
noted “that the referee’s decision was purely a technical one and as
such was not the type of decision that the panel should review.”174
Absent a showing of an error or an intentionally malicious act, the
French boxer could not gain access to the arbitration process.175
C.   The Future of the Expedited Olympic Procedures
Maintaining a reputation for independent, non-biased decision-
making will be key to the successful continuation of AHD panel arbi-
tration. However, as one commentator noted:
Those who have been active in this community for several years
understand that the sports governing bodies and oversight organi-
zations seem incapable of avoiding dominance by the will of strong,
charismatic, or politically savvy leaders who are predominately in-
terested in advancing their own agendas, rather than acting in the
best interests of the sports that they administer.176
Another area of concern is the availability of attorneys for ath-
letes going to arbitration. The attorney who represented Butch Rey-
nolds throughout his four-year battle with the IF for track and
field177 argued that the arbitration was “still an essentially in-house
procedure,” and worried that most athletes using the arbitration
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would not be represented by counsel.178 In addition to the expense of
an attorney, athletes may have a hard time finding competent repre-
sentation; most of the knowledgeable lawyers represent the govern-
ing bodies or other sports organizations that can afford to pay ex-
pensive legal fees.179
The Departments of Labor and Commerce have issued suggested
criteria to promote fairness in binding arbitration of public law dis-
putes.180 The criteria include the use of a neutral arbitrator.181 Even
though ICAS ostensibly insulates the CAS from the IOC, all the ar-
bitrations fall under the rubric of the “supreme authority” of the IOC
on all matters pertaining to the Olympics. Moreover, both the IOC
and the CAS are based in Lausanne, Switzerland. Only twelve arbi-
trators were available in Atlanta, and the panel of three that heard
each dispute was assigned, without athlete input, by ICAS.
The Labor and Commerce criteria also include availability of a
range of remedies equivalent to remedies available in court.182 For
example, an athlete could make a legitimate “after the Games” claim
for tortious interference with a business relationship. In addition, if
an athlete can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the CAS made a
mistake, there should be some venue available to recover damages
for their often very tangible loss of prize money or the less tangible
loss of a once in a life-time opportunity to compete in the Olympics.
The proposed fairness criteria also include the opportunity for
judicial review of arbitration decisions to ensure consistency with
governing laws.183 For a United States athlete who is used to having
the protection of American courts, judicial review of a CAS award by
the Swiss courts that have jurisdiction over the Swiss-based CAS
may not provide satisfactory guarantees of fairness that comport
with American law. However, conflicts between national laws are
just the situations that the IOC was trying to avoid by including the
binding arbitration clause in the first place. The price of uniformity
in international sports may necessarily be a loss of rights for United
States athletes.
VI.   CONCLUSION
An athlete has much more to lose when her eligibility is at stake
than does the IOC. The IOC will make sure that the Games go on
with or without any one given athlete, but that one athlete has no-
where else to go for Olympic competition. The IOC is in the difficult
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678 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:655
position of maintaining the highest overall standards for the Olym-
pics, yet the IOC should also be aware of the fairness concerns of in-
dividual athletes.
The Olympic arbitration process has the potential to fairly ad-
dress the overlapping jurisdictional disputes that often plague com-
petition. However, requiring as a condition of eligibility that an ath-
lete agree not to challenge a CAS award in court means that particu-
lar attention must be paid to the fairness of the process. The courts
caution for vigilance against adhesion and duress. Neutral arbitra-
tors are also essential. Mandatory, binding arbitration may not be a
panacea for all the concerns of Olympic athletes, but given the
unique circumstances of the fast-paced world of sports competition,
it may offer the most viable option to quickly settle disputes.
